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Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois and
Patronage Employment Practices:

Clarification or Confusion?
I.

INTRODUCTION

"[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."' This quote,

by Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, illustrates the deferential view the

courts once held with respect to patronage employment practices and
the effects such practices had on a public employee's freedom of
expression. Patronage has been defined as "the allocation of the
discretionary favors of government in exchange for political support."' 2 Patronage practices have been a part of the history of the
United States government, and have been used by public officials
from Presidents Jefferson, Lincoln, and Kennedy to the late Chicago

Mayor Richard Daley. 3 However, the courts' deferential view with4
respect to patronage employment practices and the first amendment

has changed significantly since Justice Holmes made his statement in
1892.
The United States Supreme Court has reflected this change in
Elrod v. Burns5 and Branti v. Finkel,6 where the Court held that

1. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517,
517 (1892) (A policeman can be removed from his job for soliciting money for
political purposes or for joining a political committee.).
2. M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR 5 (1971). The term patronage
practices will be used throughout this note as the equivalent of patronage employment
practices, unless stated otherwise.
3. See, e.g., M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR 5-6, 258, 323-28
(1971) (discussion of patronage practices); Note, Application of the FirstAmendment
L. REv. 101, 103 (1989)
to PoliticalPatronageEmployment Decisions, 58 FoRDI
(argues for protection of employees in patronage practices in certain non-firing
contexts); Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions: A Government Official's Guide to
PatronageDismissals, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 11, 13-19 (1989) (suggests course of action
for government officials to avoid violating an employee's first amendment rights).
4. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
5. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
6. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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employees may not be discharged solely on the basis of their political
affiliation or support.7 However, the Elrod and Branti decisions were
limited to patronage discharges, 8 which resulted in conflict among the
circuit courts as to whether the rationale from these cases should be
applied to patronage practices other than discharge.9
The Elrod and Branti decisions were limited by the Supreme
Court to patronage discharges until its 1990 decision in Rutan v.
0 which
Republican Party of Illinois,1
expanded these holdings. In
deciding Rutan, the Court applied the rationale of Elrod and Branti
to prohibit the use of political patronage practices in hirings, promotions, transfers, and rehires after layoffs. The significance of Rutan
lies within its establishment of uniformity among the circuit courts by
clearly defining that the Elrod and Branti holdings and rationale
extend to patronage practices other than discharge.
This note examines the disparity in the case law preceding Rutan,
the Rutan decision itself, and the implications the decision will have
in the area of political employment law. Section II discusses the
Supreme Court's decisions in Elrod and Branti, and the circuit courts'
inconsistent views in deciding whether to apply the rationale of Elrod
and Branti to patronage practices other than discharge prior to Rutan.
7. See infra notes 12-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Elrod and
Branti.
8. The Supreme Court in Elrod recognized that discharges were only one form
of political patronage and recognized that political patronage involved a broad range
of activities including putting loyal supporters in governmental jobs, giving lucrative
contracts to favored parties, and giving improved public services to favored wards.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976). However, the Court stated "we are here
concerned only with the constitutionality of dismissing public employees for partisan
reasons." Id. The Branti decision is also limited to discharges. Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 513 n.7 (1980).
9. "I note only that, .... the division among the circuits appears to deepen."

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 868 F.2d 943, 959 (7th Cir. 1989) (Ripple, J.,
dissenting). See also Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 623 (4th Cir. 1980) (see
infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Delong); Bennis v.
Gable, 823 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987) (see infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Bennis); Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896, 890-900 (2d Cir. 1988)
(denial of compensation and vacation time stated a cause of action); Clark v. Library
of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (denial of promotion because of field
investigation based on political affiliation stated a cause of action); Rosenthal v.
Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390, 392 (3d Cir. 1977) (cannot condition hiring or discharge of an
employee on first amendment freedoms); Cullen v. New York State Civil Service
Commission, 435 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 846
(2d Cir. 1977) (hiring and promotion based on monetary political support is unconstitutional).
10.

-

U.S.

-,

110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 13 (1990).
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Section III examines the Rutan decision itself. Section IV analyzes
the Rutan decision and discusses its implications for the 17 million
federal, state, county, and local government employees throughout
the United States." This note concludes that the Rutan decision will
increase confusion in patronage employment law rather than decrease
it. Even though the Court resolved the conflict of whether Elrod and

Branti should be applied to employment practices other than discharges, it has failed to seize the opportunity to clarify the scope of
the Branti test that is used to determine who is afforded first amend-

ment protection.
II.
A.

PRIOR POLITICAL PATRONAGE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS

THE SUPREME COURT DISCHARGE CASES

In 1976, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
patronage discharges in Elrod v. Burns. 2 After being elected sheriff
in 1970, Richard Elrod followed a Cook County sheriff's tradition by
discharging numerous non-civil-service employees because they were
affiliated with the opposing political party.' 3 The discharged Repubwere
lican employees brought suit contesting their discharges, which
4
party.'
Republican
the
with
affiliated
being
on
solely
based
In deciding Elrod, the Supreme Court held that discharging or
threatening to discharge public employees based solely on their political affiliation violated the employees' first and fourteenth" amend-

11. Chicago Tribune, June 22, 1990, § 1, at 8, col. 1. "The decision is expected
to have the greatest impact on local and state employment practices, with little or no
effect on the federal system." The Washington Post, June 22, 1990, § 1, at 1, col.
2.

12. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). See also Note, Patronageand the First Amendment
After Elrod v. Burns, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 468, 468 (1978) (argues Elrod should apply
to hiring).
13. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1976).
14. Id. at 350. Additionally, one employee who was in danger of being fired
sought an injunction to prevent his discharge. Id. at 350-51.
15. The fourteenth amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
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ment rights and was therefore unconstitutional.' 6 The plurality
concluded that patronage dismissals violated two constitutional principles: first, that patronage discharges infringed upon an employee's
first amendment rights of political belief and association; and second,
that patronage discharges conditioned the receipt of government
benefits upon the first amendment. 7
Justice Brennan stated in the plurality opinion of Elrod that
"political belief and association constitute the core of those activities
protected by the First Amendment."'" The Court noted that forcing
an employee to support and monetarily contribute to a party he
preferred not to associate with has been previously recognized as
"tantamount to coerced belief."' 9 The plurality added "if there is
any fixed star in our constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics ..2.0.",
The opinion further concluded that conditioning continued employment on political affiliation inevitably forced employees to support a political party with which they preferred not to associate. 2'
23
Relying on Perry v. Sindermann22 and Keyishian v. Board of Regents,

protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. cl.1.

In deciding children could not be forced to salute the American flag at a public
school the Supreme Court said, "It is important to note that while it is the fourteenth
amendment which bears directly upon the state it is the more specific limiting
principles of the first amendment that finally govern this case." Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (quoting Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943)).
16. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373. The Court stated that the practice of discharging
employees solely on their political affiliation severely restricted the employees ability
to exercise their rights of political belief and association. Id. at 372.
17. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-59 (1976).
18. Id. at 356.

19. Id. at 355.
20. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (quoting Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
21. Id. at 356.
22. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Perry involved a nontenured state college professor,
whose contract was not renewed because he publicly criticized the college administration's policies. The Supreme Court held, that even though he lacked a tenure right
to reemployment, to base his termination on his criticism of the college policies was
a violation of his right to free speech. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594-603
(1972).
23. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In Keyishian teachers could not be denied employment
for failing to take an oath stating that they did not belong to any subversive
organizations. The case held political association could not be an adequate basis for
denying public employment without violating the first amendment. Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591-93 (1967).

1991:3751

R UTAN

the Elrod Court stated that the government could not deny benefits
to an employee based on reasons that infringe upon his constitutional
rights. 24 The Court, relying again on Perry, stated that even if a

person has no right to an important governmental benefit and even
that the
though the benefit may be denied, there are some reasons
25

government may not rely upon when denying the benefit.
In Elrod, for a patronage practice to be found constitutional
when applied to public employees, it must survive "exacting scrutiny." '26 The Court stated that "exacting scrutiny" required the practice at issue to "further some vital government end by a means that
is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in achieving
that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights." 27
The Elrod plurality, in applying "exacting scrutiny," determined
that the patronage practices at issue were not justified by the asserted
28
governmental interests and were unconstitutional. The Court concluded that the vital government interest of efficiency and effectiveness29
may be better served by other less restrictive means than discharge.
24. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1976). The court relied on numerous
other cases in its determination: United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 8182 (1947) (workers brought an action to enjoin enforcement of § 9(a) of the Hatch
Political Activity Act); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (loyalty oath
violated the fourteenth amendment due process clause); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 899 (1961) (military installation commander may stop a civilian
employee from entering a military installation to work, if the employee is a security
risk); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (oath requiring a belief in God
for public office invaded freedom of first and fourteenth amendments); Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968) (teachers may speak out on public
issue of funds for educational purposes without fear of retaliatory dismissals);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (unemployment compensation may not
be withheld from an employee who was denied employment because of religious
beliefs); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (veterans claiming tax exemption
not required to execute a declaration of allegiance to receive tax exemption); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 260-61 (1967) (unconstitutional for Subversive Activities
Control Act to deny communist group members employment in any defense facility).
25. Elrod v. Branti, 427 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1975) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). The Court also relied on: Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (cannot terminate public employee for teaching treasonous
or seditious words or acts); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (unconstitutional to deny unemployment compensation to employee who refused work because
of religious reasons).
26. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976).
27. Id.

28. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-373 (1976).
29. Id. at 372.
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The Court then stated that the contribution of patronage dismissals
to the democratic process failed to outweigh their serious infringement
upon a public employee's first amendment freedoms.3 0
The plurality opinion gave public employees first amendment
protection from patronage discharges, but did not make this constitutional protection absolute. 3 The plurality noted that sometimes a
public employee's first amendment rights are outweighed by the
government's vital interest of protecting the policies of a new administration.12 The Court formulated an exception to the first amendment
protection given to public employees to further this vital government
interest.33 The exception allowed employees who were in "policymaking positions" to be discharged based solely on political affiliation. 4
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Elrod added the exception of "confidential employees" to the plurality's original exception of "policymaking positions."5
In 1980, the constitutionality of political patronage discharges
was addressed again by the Supreme Court in Branti v. Finkel.3 6 After
30. Id. at 373.

31. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).
32. Id. at 367. Brennan stated that:
A second interest advanced in support of patronage is the need for political
loyalty of employees, not to the end that effectiveness and efficiency be
insured, but to the end that representative government not be undercut by
tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new administration,
policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate ....

Id.

Limiting patronage

dismissals to policymaking positions is sufficient to achieve this governmental end.

33. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976). The Court applied a balancing
test and concluded that the only time a public employee's first amendment rights
yield to the government's vital interest is when the public employee fits into the
exception. Id.
34. Id. at 372. The Court determined that policymaking employees furthered
the government's interest in effectively implementing new administrative policies. Id.
The Court stated there was no bright-line distinction between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions, but gave certain criteria to look to in making an evaluation
of an employee's position. Id. at 367. First, "An employee with responsibilities that

are not well defined or are of broad scope more likely functions in a policymaking
position." Id. at 368. Second, look to whether "the employee acts as an advisor or
formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals." Id.
35. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976) ( Stewart, J., concurring). The
Supreme Court added Justice Stewart's confidential exception to the plurality's
exception in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980). See infra notes 36-47 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Branti.

36. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). For a general discussion of Branti see, Note, Consti-
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being appointed public defender, Branti began termination proceedings against six of the nine assistant defenders, who were employees
at-will." Each of the discharged assistant defenders were to be replaced
by (a) a Democrat or (b) a person recommended or sponsored by a
Democrat.38 Because of Branti's actions, two of the soon-to-be discharged assistant defenders brought suit to enjoin Branti from dis39
charging them because of their political belief.
In deciding Branti, the Court held that the first amendment
prohibited a public defender from discharging assistant public defenders because they lacked the support of the party in power, even though
the public defender did not attempt to coerce the assistants to change
their political beliefs. 40 The Court stated, "to prevail in this type of
an action, it was sufficient, as Elrod holds, for respondents to prove
that they were discharged 'solely for the reason that they were not
' 41
The Court
affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party."'

also added that discharged employees need not "prove that they, or
changing, either actually or
other employees, had been coerced ' into
42
ostensibly, their political allegiance.
Additionally, the Branti Court modified the Elrod test used to
determine who should be given protected status by the first amendment .4 3 The Elrod test allowed politically motivated discharges only
when the employee's position was a policymaking or confidential
one." The Branti Court reasoned that the government may use
tutional Law-First Amendment-Patronage Dismissals Not Permitted Unless Party
Affiliation Relevant to Job Performance, 29 KAN. L. REV. 286 (1981) and Note,

Branti v. Finkel: A Fresh Look At The Spoils System, 1 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 103

(1980).
37. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 509 (1980).
38. Id. at 510.
39. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1285 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978)). Branti tried to convince the district court that the dismissals were based
on nonpolitical grounds. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 510 (1980). However, the
Court relied on the district court's findings that: "The sole grounds for the attempted
removal of plaintiffs were the facts that plaintiffs' political beliefs differed from
those of the ruling Democratic majority in the County Legislature and that the
Democratic majority had determined that Assistant Defender appointments were to
be made on political bases." Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 510 (1980) (quoting
Branti v. Finkel, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D. N.Y. 1978)).
40. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 516 (1980).
41. Id. at 517 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976)).
42. Id.
110 S. Ct. 2729,
-. U.S. __,
43. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
2735 n.5 (1990) ("Branti . . . refined the exception created by Elrod .....
44. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
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political affiliation in discharging some employees who were in positions that were not considered to be policymaking or confidential.4 5
The Court also found that not all policymaking or confidential
positions require party affiliation.4 6 In determining who will be afforded first amendment protection, the Court stated the following
test:
[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker'
or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question
is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved.41
Because the Supreme Court limited the decisions and rationale
of Elrod and Branti to discharge cases, the federal circuit courts of
appeals were left to analyze whether the decisions should be applied
to patronage practices beyond discharge. The different analyses applied by the circuit courts resulted in a wide variance of constitutional
protection for public employees.
B.

CIRCUIT COURT EXPANSIONS OF ELROD AND BRANTI

In analyzing whether to apply the Elrod and Branti decisions and
rationale, the lower federal courts adopted significantly different tests
for determining whether certain employment practices other than
discharges were constitutionally protected. The different tests of the
circuit courts provided varying degrees of protection for possible first
amendment infringements in patronage practices.48 Delong v. United
States9 and Bennis v. Gable0 illustrate the disparity within the federal
45. Id. For example, the Court noted when the state requires that each electorial
precinct be supervised by two judges of different parties, then a Republican's
discharge based solely on his changing his party affiliation would be constitutional.
Id.
46. Id. The Court noted that a public university's football coach is a policymaker, but being politically affiliated with a certain party does not make him a better
coach. Id.
47. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1976). Justice Stevens realized that it
would not be easy to determine whether a position was one that legitimized the use
of political affiliation. Id.
48. See supra note 9 and infra note 167 for different interpretations by the

circuit courts in applying Branti and Elrod to public employment practices.
49. 621 F.2d
for a discussion of
50. 823 F.2d
for a discussion of

618 (4th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text
Delong.
723, (3d Cir. 1987). See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text
Bennis.

1991:375]

R UTAN

circuits at the time Rutan was argued in the lower federal courts.
In Delong v. United States,5 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether to extend the
Elrod and Branti holdings and rationale beyond discharges to include
other patronage employment practices, such as transfers and reassignments.52 Delong was a former Director of the Farm and Home
Administration Division of the United States Department of Agriculture for the state of Maine. He brought suit challenging his reassignment and geographical transfer to Washington D.C. which were
motivated by political considerations.53 Delong's transfer was a result
of the Democratic Presidential victory, after which the United States
Secretary of Agriculture replaced Republican state directors with
Democrats . 4 Delong was reassigned to a newly created "program
assistant" position instead of being discharged, because he was a
former Republican director with veteran status." The reassignment to
56
this new position entailed a substantial reduction in responsibility.
In deciding Delong, the circuit court remanded the case for
57
reconsideration in light of the newly articulated test in Branti.
However, the circuit court then went on to determine that patronage
practices other than threatened or actual discharges might also violate
a public employee's first amendment rights.5" The court stated "the
Elrod-Brantiprinciple must be construed to provide protection against
a wider range of patronage burdens than threatened or actual dismissals." 59 However, this apparently broad statement which protected
employees was limited to include only patronage practices "that can
51. 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980).
52. Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 622 (4th Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 620-21. The state director position was classified as a "'schedule A'
exception from the competitive civil service, and as one not 'of a confident or policydetermining character."' Id. at 621. However, the actual policymaking responsibilities
of the state director position were questionable. Id. at 621.
54. Id. at 621.
55. Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. The state director's position involved the supervision of 175 employees,
final authority over $130 million in loans, and responsibility to plan, implement, and
organize state programs. Id. Conversely, the person filling the "program assistant"
position had little to do, had no secretary or staff, had no long range assignments,
never met the administrator to whom he was to report, had been "given orders for
repeated travel," had been transferred "to inconvenient or distant locations on short
notice," and had been given petty assignments. Id.
57. Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 622 (4th Cir. 1980).
58. Id.

59. Id. at 623.
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be determined to be the substantial equivalent of dismissal. '" 60 The
court stated that for the patronage practice to be determined unconstitutional it must "in fact impose upon the employee such a Hobson's
choice between resignation and surrender of protected rights as to be
' 61
tantamount to outright dismissal.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also
addressed the issue of whether to extend the Elrod and Brantirationale
to patronage practices other than discharges. In Bennis v. Gable,62
two Allentown, Pennsylvania, police officers brought suit after being
demoted from detective-sergeants to patrolmen following their support
of the current mayor's political opponent. 6a The police officers'
4
demotions resulted in a substantial reduction in salary.
In Bennis, the circuit court vacated the district court's judgment
and remanded the case for a new trial because the district court
incorrectly ruled, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs were involved
in protected first amendment activities. 65 Because the circuit court felt
that certain issues would surface at the new trial, it addressed them
even though, as a general rule, issues not determinative to a case on
appeal should not be decided.66
In addressing these issues, the court stated that even though Elrod
and Branti involved only discharges from employment, the rationale
of each decision dealt with the broader issue of the constitutionality
of adverse employment practices in retaliation for an employee's
exercise of first amendment freedoms. 67 Therefore, the court stated,
the violation of the constitution was "not in the harshness of the
sanction applied, but in the imposition of any disciplinary action for
the exercise of permissible free speech." ' 6 In stating that "any disciplinary action" for an exercise of first amendment freedoms is enough
to sustain a Branti cause of action, the court rejected the Delong

60. Id. at 624.
61. Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 624 (4th Cir. 1980). On remand,
Delong proved that his transfer was "tantamount" to a dismissal. Hoffinger, First
Amendment Limitations on Patronage Employment Practices, 49 U. Cm. L. REV.
181, 192 n.75 (1982) (citing Delong v. United States, No. 78-294-A (E.D. Va. Sept.
18, 1980)).
62. 823 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987).
63. Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987).
64. Id. at 726.
65. Id. at 735.
66. Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 730-31 (3d Cir. 1987).
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
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analysis requiring that Branti be restricted to practices that are "the
substantial equivalent of dismissal." 69
The Delong and Bennis decisions represent two significantly

different tests used by the circuit courts prior to the Rutan decision.
The use of these different tests by the circuit courts illustrated the
need for the Supreme Court to determine whether the Elrod and
Branti rationale should be applied to patronage practices other than
discharge.

III.
A.

RUTAN V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ILLINOIS

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In Rutan, the petitioners 70 brought suit against numerous Illinois
Republican Party officials 7' for first amendment violations that re-

sulted from alleged discriminatory state employment practices that
69. Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 731 n.9 (3d Cir. 1987). The court explicitly
rejected the Delong "substantially equivalent of dismissal" standard. Id. The Second
Circuit in Lieberman v. Reisman disagreed with the test enunciated in Delong and
then adopted the test enunciated in Bennis. Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896,
900 (2d Cir. 1988).
70. The petitioners:
Cynthia Rutan, Franklin Taylor, Dan O'Brian, Ricky Standefer, and James
Moore filed this action on July 1, 1985, in their individual capacities and
on behalf of six asserted plaintiff classes. These classes include: (1) all voters
in the state of Illinois; (2) all taxpayers in the state of Illinois; (3) all
employees of the State of Illinois who desire a promotion; (4) all employees
of the State of Illinois who desire a transfer; (5) all employees of the State
of Illinois who have been laid off but not rehired; and (6) all persons who
desire employment with the State of Illinois.
1986).
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 641 F. Supp. 249, 251 (C.D. I11.
71. The petitioners named the following Republicans:
The defendants include the Republican Party of Illinois, two Republican
Party officials, Governor James R. Thompson, and seven former or current
state government officials. The state officials, including Governor Thompson, are sued individually and in their official capacities. In addition, the
defendant Greg Baise is sued as representative of a purported defendant
class consisting of all 'directors, heads or chief executive officers . . .since
February 1, 1981, of departments, boards, and commissions under the
jurisdiction of the Governor of the State of Illinois.' The defendant Lynn
Quigley is likewise sued as a representative of a purported defendant class
consisting of all "liaisons" between the Governor's Office of Personnel and
the departments, boards, and commissions under the jurisdiction of the
Governors since February 1, 1981.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 641 F. Supp. 249, 251 (C.D. I111986).
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were instituted by Governor James Thompson.7 2 The Governor had
issued a hiring freeze for every agency, board, bureau, and commission within his control.73 The freeze prevented state agencies from
hiring employees, filling vacancies, creating new positions, or taking
similar action.7 4 Governor Thompson required that any exceptions to
the freeze must have his "express permission after submission of
appropriate requests to [his] office." 7 5 Additionally, Thompson created the Governor's Office of Personnel to determine whether the
required permission was to be granted or denied.7 6 State agencies
screened applicants under the Illinois civil service system, and then
submitted the prospective employee's application to the Governor's
Office of Personnel for the required approval. 77 In determining whether
to grant the required permission, the Governor's Office of Personnel
was alleged to have been "substantially motivated by political considerations. ' 78 The petitioners claimed that through the use of the
72. The Rutan decision was before the Supreme Court in a preliminary stage
with the question being limited to whether petitioners had stated a first amendment
claim that was sufficient to withstand the respondent's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, U.S....
110 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 n.l (1990).
73. Id. at 2732. The Governor's Executive Order No. 5 (Nov. 12, 1980) stated:
Effective at the close of business today, November 12, 1980, no agency,
department, bureau, board or commission subject to the control or direction
of the Governor shall hire any employee, fill any vacancy, create any new
position or take any other action which will result in increases, or the
maintenance of present levels, in State employment, including personal
service contracts. All hiring is frozen. There will be no exceptions to this
order without my express permission after submission of appropriate requests to my office.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 868 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir. 1989). However,
the alleged effects of this freeze contradicted with the statement made by Thompson
during his 1977 inauguration. In 1977 Thompson stated, "No job will be bought, no
favors will be sold. No citizen seeking help will be asked his[-Jher party allegiance or
political loyalty." Chicago Tribune, June 22, 1990 § 1, at 8, col. 5.
74. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
-, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2732 (1990). The Governor's action affected approximately 60,000 state positions, of
which 5,000 positions normally became available each year. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
-, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2732 (1990).
78. Id. Petitioners claimed the Governor's Office of Personnel looked to:
whether the applicant voted in Republican primaries in past election years,
whether the applicant has provided financial or other support to the Republican Party and its candidates, whether the applicant has promised to join
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Governor's Office of Personnel, Governor Thompson operated a

patronage system limiting employment to those persons who were
supported by the Republican Party.79
The petitioners 0 claimed they were discriminated against by the
state in employment decisions, because they had not been affiliated
with or supported by the state's Republican Party and that this
discrimination violated their first amendment rights. 8 Petitioner Cynthia Rutan has worked for the state of Illinois as a rehabilitation
counselor since 1974.82 Though qualified, she claimed she had been

repeatedly denied promotions to supervisory positions because she did

not work for or support the Republican Party.83 Petitioner Franklin

Taylor, a road equipment operator for the state of Illinois, claimed
that in 1983 he was denied a promotion because he lacked the support
of the local Republican Party.14 Additionally, he claimed he was

denied a geographical transfer to a work location closer to his home
because a Republican Party chairman opposed the transfer.

5

Peti-

tioner James Moore claimed he was repeatedly denied employment at
a state prison because he also lacked the support of the Republican
6

Party.
Respondents claimed that as a matter of law, petitioners had

failed to state a claim. Therefore, four of the original five plaintiffs
8
were also before the Court as cross-respondents.

7

Two of the cross-

respondents alleged they were not rehired after layoffs because they

Id.

and work for the Republican Party in the future, and whether the applicant
has the support of Republican Party officials at state or local levels.

79. Id. The claims brought by the plaintiffs were that employment decisions
which consider political affiliation violate "the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to free
speech and association, due process and equal protection, and to a republican form
of government." Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 641 F. Supp. 249, 252 (C.D.
I11.1986). The petitioners sought relief under several state and federal theories. See
infra note 96 for the treatment of the plaintiffs' claims.
80. Rutan, Taylor, and Moore are the petitioners in this case and are three of
the five plaintiffs who originated this lawsuit. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
U.S.

__,

110 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 n.1 (1990).

81. Id. at 2732-33.
82. Id. at 2733.
83. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
2733 (1990).
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,

2733 (1990).

-,

-U.S.

-..
_U.S.

__,

110 S. Ct. 2729,

110 S. Ct. 2729,
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lacked the necessary Republican credentials."8 Ricky Standefer, a
former temporary state garage worker, claimed he was not recalled
after a layoff because he voted in a Democratic primary and did not
support the Republican Party. 9 Dan O'Brian, a former Department
of Mental Health dietary manager also claimed he was not rehired
after a layoff because of his party affiliation. 9o However, after gaining
the support of the local Republican Party, he was reinstated as a state
employee, but to a lower paying position with the Department of
Corrections. 9
Regardless of petitioners' allegations of inequitable circumstances, the district court in Rutan refused to extend the Supreme
Court's rationale in Elrod and Branti beyond discharge cases. 92 The
district court relied upon the decisions in Avery v. Jennings93 and
LaFalce v. Houston" which refused to extend the Elrod and Branti
rationale to situations involving the use of political factors in granting
contracts and in hiring public employees. 95 The district court granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss because Rutan involved hirings,
promotions, transfers, and rehires and did not involve discharges.9

1986).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 641 F. Supp. 249, 253 (C.D. Ill.

93. 786 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1986) (the Elrod and Branti decisions do not
prohibit hiring of friends or applicants referred by political allies), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 905 (1986).
94. 712 F.2d 292, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1983) (The court refused to extend the Elrod
and Branti decisions to patronage considerations in awarding contracts.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
95. Id. at 253-54. The district court also acknowledged that some courts have
extended the Elrod and Branti decisions to punitive actions or those actions that
amounted to a dismissal. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 641 F. Supp. 249,
253 n.1, 255 (C.D. Ill. 1986). However, the plaintiffs' claim did not successfully
allege that any of the wrongful actions were punitive. Id. at 255.
96. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 641 F. Supp. 249, 253 (C.D. I11.
1986). All of the plaintiffs claims were dismissed. The plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. 1983
claim was dismissed by the district court. The plaintiffs' first amendment claims as
taxpayers and voters were dismissed for lack of standing. Id. at 256. The plaintiffs'
42 U.S.C. 1985 claim and Guarantee Clause claim were conceded by the plaintiffs as
insufficient. Id. at 257. Additionally, the plaintiffs' due process and equal protection
claims under the fourteenth amendment failed to state causes of action. Id. at 25758. Furthermore, the state claims were barred by the eleventh amendment and those
state claims not barred were dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 258.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
a panel opinion, addressed two of the petitioners' claims that were
collectively advanced on appeal.97 The petitioners' first claim was that
as employees or potential employees the patronage system violated
their rights under the first amendment.9 s The petitioners' second claim
challenged the patronage system as voters, alleging deprivation of
"equal access and effectiveness of elections."'9
In analyzing the petitioners' first claim as current employees, the
court stated that the Supreme Court limited the rationale in Elrod
I
and Branti to patronage discharges. '0 Relying on the decision in
0' the court expressed the general hesitancy of
LaFalce v. Houston,
02
the circuit courts to extend the rule enunciated in Elrod and Branti.1
Even with this hesitancy, the Seventh Circuit looked to and adopted
the standard enunciated in the Fourth Circuit's decision in Delong v.
United States,03 which extended the Elrod and Branti decisions to
include challenges to patronage practices that "can be determined to
°4
be the substantial equivalent of dismissal."" In adopting the Delong

1988).

97. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (7th Cir.

98. Id. The first amendment is applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Id. See supra note 4 for the text of the first amendment.
99. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1411 (7th Cir. 1988).
100. Id. at 1402.
101. LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F. 2d 292, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1044 (1984) (The court refused to extend the Elrod and Branti rationale to
patronage considerations in awarding contracts.).
102. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1988).
103. 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Delong.
104. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1988). The
Delong court's reasoning relied on by the Seventh Circuit, in adopting the standard,
was the following:
Dismissal or threat of dismissal for political patronage reasons is of course
the ultimate means of achieving by indirect command to a government
employee to cease exercising protected rights of free political association
and speech. This is Elrod's and Branti's specific narrow application of the
principle. We believe that when the principle is applied to patronage practices
other than dismissal it is rightly confined to those that can be determined
to be the substantial equivalent of dismissal.
Id. at 1403, (quoting Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1980)).
To determine if the employment practice was equivalent to a dismissal, the court
adopted "the same question presented in constructive discharge cases, that is, whether
a particular patronage decision would lead a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
position to feel compelled to leave his job." Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
868 F.2d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 1989). See, e.g., Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d
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standard, the Seventh Circuit discarded the Third Circuit's Bennis v.

Gable'05 test that extended the Elrod and Branti rationale to any
"disciplinary action" by a public employer.' °0 The Seventh Circuit
then reversed and remanded the previously dismissed promotion,

transfer and rehire claims.' 0 7 The court of appeals further stated that
on remand the Delong analysis should be applied to determine if the
denial of the promotions, transfers and rehires were the "substantial

equivalent of dismissal."
In analyzing the petitioners' claim as future employees, the
Seventh Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education.0 8 In Wygant, the Supreme Court

determined that losing potential employment is not as intrusive as

losing present employment.' 0 9 The Seventh Circuit also looked to the

Sixth Circuit's decision in Avery v. Jennings,"0 which implicitly
recognized a distinction between patronage discharges and less burdensome patronage practices."' The Seventh Circuit, relying on Wygant,"' 2 affirmed the dismissal of the hiring claim, holding that

690, 697 (7th Cir. 1984) (grievance procedure was inadequate for a policeman's
constructive discharge). See also, Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1406 (7th Cir.
1988) (refusal of teacher to work in a nonteaching job was not a constructive
resignation, but a discharge without due process).
The adoption of the Delong test by the court was opposed by Justice Ripple in
his dissent.
Although the Delong test attempts to apply the Elrod criteria to cases not
involving discharge, its approach is an illusory one. It places an unrealistic
burden of proof on the plaintiff and creates an impossible judicial task. To
succeed, the plaintiff must establish that, although a reasonable person
would resign under such pressure to his first amendment rights, he has
decided to 'hang on.' It is not surprising that the Delong test would produce
such an unrealistic burden of proof; it is premised on a fundamental
misapprehension of the analysis required to establish first amendment
jurisprudence.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1412 (7th Cir. 1988) (Ripple,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. 823 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987). See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Bennis.
106. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1404 (7th Cir. 1988).
107. Id. at 1408.
108. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
109. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1406 (7th Cir. 1988).
110. Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1986) (Elrod and Branti do
not prohibit the hiring of friends or applicants referred by political allies), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986).
111. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1406 (7th Cir. 1988).
112. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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conditioning employment on political affiliation was constitutional.
The Seventh Circuit then examined the petitioners' second claim,
which challenged the patronage system as voters and alleged that the
patronage system was a deprivation bf "equal access and effectiveness
of elections."" ' 3 The Seventh Circuit relied on its prior precedent in
Shakman v. Dunne"4 and affirmed the district court's finding that
the petitioners, as voters, lacked standing to bring such an action." 5
After the panel opinion by the Seventh Circuit rejecting the petitioners' claims, the court reheard the appeal en banc." 6 The Seventh
Circuit en banc issued essentially the same 7opinion that was filed in
the panel's initial consideration of Rutan."
Following the rehearing by the Seventh Circuit, the petitioners
were granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court to review
the Delong test adopted by the Seventh Circuit and to review the

dismissed hiring claim."' Additionally, respondents cross-petitioned
the Court contesting the Seventh Circuit's remand of four of the
113. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1411 (7th Cir. 1988).
114. 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988). The
Court, relying on the reasoning in Shakman, found the causation chain to be too
tenuous:
[We] find the line of causation between the appellants' activity and the
[Tihe line of
appellees' asserted injury to be particularly attenuated ....
causation depends upon countless individual decisions. Moreover, those
countless individual decisions must depend upon . . . countless individual
political assessments that those who are in power will stay in power. It is
not the hiring policy itself which creates any advantage for the incumbents.
Any other candidate is entirely free to assert that, if elected, he will follow
the same policy. Any advantage obtained by the incumbent is obtained only
if the potential workers make an independent evaluation that the incumbent,
and not the opposition, will win. The plaintiffs will be at a disadvantage
if-and only if-a significant number of individuals seeking political job
opportunities determines the 'ins' will remain the 'ins'.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1411 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387, 1397 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065
(1988)). See generally, Johnson, Successful Reform Litigation: The Shakman Patronage Case, 64 Cm.[-]KENT L. REv. 479 (1988) (discussion of Shakman and the standing
issue); Strauss, Legality, Activism, and The Patronage Case, 64 CH.[-]KENT L. REv.
585 (1988) (discussion of Shakman and the unenforceability of federal rights because
of flexible and discretionary doctrines).
115. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1412 (7th Cir. 1988).
116. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 868 F.2d 943, 943 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc).
117. Id. at 959 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110 S. Ct. 2729,
__,
-U.S.
118. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
2733 (1990).
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claims, asserting that as a matter of law, the employment decisions
did not violate the first amendment." 9
B.

DECISION AND RATIONALE

The United States Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision, extended
the Elrod and Branti rationale to patronage hirings, promotions,
transfers and recalls after layoff. 20 In extending the Elrod and Branti
decisions, the Court held that all the petitioners and cross-respondents
had stated claims upon which relief might be granted. 2' The Supreme
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's remand of the promotion,
transfer and rehiring claims, and reversed the circuit court's decision
to uphold the dismissal of the hiring claim. 22 The Supreme Court
remanded all the claims for proceedings consistent with the opinion.123
Justice Brennan, in writing for the majority, first analyzed the
Court's reasoning in the Elrod opinion. 124 In Elrod, the Court determined that the patronage practice of replacing staff members with
members of the favored party "unquestionably inhibits protected
beliefs and association."'' 25 The Court then discussed the Branti
decision, where it was determined that to state a cause of action, the
plaintiff need only show that his discharge was due to his lack of
affiliation or sponsorship by the favored party. 26
In addressing the claims of the four current and former employees, the Court rejected the respondents' arguments that the petitioners
were not entitled to promotions, transfers or rehires, and that the
petitioners' first amendment rights had not been infringed.1 27 The
Court relied on Perry21 to explain the viability of a first amendment
claim:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear
that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable govern119. Id.
120. Id.at 2739.
121. Id. at 2739.
122. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
-U.S.
-,
110 S. Ct. 2729,
2739 (1990).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2734-35.
125. Id. at 2734. See supra notes 12-35 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Elrod.
126. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, __U.S.
-,
110 S. Ct. 2729,
2735 (1990). See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Branti.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 22, 25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Perry.
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mental benefit and even though the government may deny him
the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons
upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests - especially, his interest in freedom of
speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person
because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'produce
Such interfera result which [it] could not command directly.' 29
ence with constitutional rights is impermissible.
The Court also rejected the respondents' argument that the
employment decisions at issue were not punitive and therefore not in
violation of the petitioners' first amendment rights. 30 Respondents
contended that employment decisions that are not punitive "do not
in any way adversely affect the terms of employment, and therefore
do not chill the exercise of protected belief and association by public
employees."'' In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that there
are employees who will be denied advancement or movement because
of their political affiliation, which is a significant penalty.' The
Court stated:
Employees who do not compromise their beliefs stand to
lose the considerable increases in pay and job satisfaction
attendant to promotions, the hours and maintenance expenses
that are consumed by long daily commutes, and even their
jobs if they are not rehired after a 'temporary' layoff. These
are significant penalties and are imposed for the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.' 33
110 S. Ct. 2729,
-. U.S. __
129. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
2736 (1990) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), and Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). This quote or portions of this quote also appear
in the Elrod, Branti, and Delong decisions. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 51415 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976); Delong v. United States, 621
F.2d 618, 623 (4th Cir. 1980). Speiser involved veterans claiming tax exemption,
holding that they could not be required to execute a declaration of allegiance to
receive the tax exemption. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
__, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
-U.S.
130. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
2736 (1990).
131. Id. at 2736.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Furthermore, the Court stated that patronage practices must be
"narrowly tailored to further vital government interests" or the
34
practice will be found to be a violation of first amendment freedoms.'
The Court relied upon the analysis in Elrod and Branti to
determine when patronage could be constitutionally practiced.' 35 The

Court stated that the government interest in securing effective em-

ployees may be furthered by the less restrictive means of discharging,
transferring or demoting those employees whose work performance is

deficient. 3 6 However, the Court noted that the government's interest
in securing employees who will be faithful in implementing its policies
may be served by choosing or discharging certain high-level employees
on a patronage basis.'
The Court concluded that basing promotions, transfers and rehires on political affiliation or support is "an impermissible infringement on the first amendment rights of public employees."' Therefore,
the four employees who claimed that they were denied promotions,
transfers and rehires based on political affiliation had stated claims
under 42 U.S.C. 1983119 for violations of the first and fourteenth
amendments.

140

134. Id.

135. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -. U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2737 (1990).
136. Id.
137. Id. As in Elrod and Branti the policymaker exception determines whether
the employee is to receive first amendment protection. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 517-18 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976).
138. Id.
139. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute
of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
140. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -. U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2738 (1990). The elements of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim include: (a) a defendant
acting under color of state law; (b) a plaintiff deprived of a specific articulable right;
and (c) that defendant's conduct was a cause in fact of plaintiff's deprivation.
German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp. 822, 828 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Afro-American deputy
court clerk, who was suspended pending the outcome of his criminal prosecution,
brought a civil action for his suspension.). See supra note 139 for the text of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).

1991:375]

RUTAN

Additionally, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's "substantially equivalent of a dismissal" test used to determine if patronage
practices violate an employee's first amendment rights.' 4' The Court
found this test to be unduly restrictive because it did not recognize
that employment practices other than discharges still force government
employees and applicants to "conform their [political] beliefs and
associations to some state-selected orthodoxy." 1 42 Although the Court
rejected the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, the Court affirmed the
43
Seventh Circuit's remand of these claims.
After the Court determined that promotions, transfers and rehires
based on political affiliation stated a claim upon which relief might
be granted, it examined the claim that patronage hiring violated a
future employee's first amendment rights. 44 The Court determined
that the burdens imposed upon a future or current employee's free
speech and association are similar, whether the patronage practices
4
are promotions, transfers, rehires or hiring.'
The Court then rejected the respondents' claim that the burden
imposed on a future employee was not of a constitutional magnitude. ' The Court relied upon numerous cases as precedent which
established that hiring decisions based upon political affiliation or
support are unconstitutional unless there is a vital government interest. 47 In addition, the Court found that the Seventh Circuit's reliance
141. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
2737 (1990).

-U.S.

,

110 S. Ct. 2729,

142. Id.

143. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2738 (1990).
144. Id.
I do not believe this Court has ever made any distinction between the
applicant and those who are incumbent. The Torcaso case, Keyishian, Perry,
can certainly be viewed as an applicant because this Court held even if he
had no right, no expectation of continuing employment, that if he were not
given a year's teaching contract because of his first amendment rights, he
had stated a cause of action.
This Court recently addressed the applicant for unemployment compensation benefits in Frazee and in Hobbie, and again found no distinction
between - no distinction in regard to first amendment rights.
Official Transcript, Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the Unites States at
14, Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,

-U.S.

., 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990)

(No. 88-1872 & 88-2074), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 13 (1990).
145. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
2739 (1990).

146. Id.
147. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,

-U.S.

-U.S.

110 S. Ct. 2729,

-,

,

110 S. Ct. 2729,
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on Wygant, to distinguish hiring from dismissal, was inappropriate.

4

Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the Seventh Circuit's

dismissal of the hiring claim, holding that "conditioning hiring deci-

sions on political belief and association plainly constitutes an unconstitutional condition. ''149
Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices, dissented from the
majority opinion, arguing against the extension of the Elrod and

Branti rationale to other patronage employment practices. Scalia
argued that the Elrod and Branti decisions had resulted in confusion
and should be overruled or restricted to their limited factual holdings. 5 0 Even though Scalia attacked the majority opinion on numerous
fronts, he stated: "The whole point of my dissent is that the desirability of patronage is a policy question to be decided by the people's

representatives; I do not mean, therefore, to endorse that system."''

2738 (1990). See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (lost job opportunities for failing
to change' convictions stated a constitutional claim); Keyishian v. Board of Regents
of Univ. of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (law regulating teachers' employment
unconstitutionally restricted political belief and association); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966) (loyalty oath as a prerequisite to employment was struck down);
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (regulation that a Republican may
not be appointed to a federal office was invalid).
148. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
-, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2739 (1990). Wygant involved a school board's implementation of an affirmative
action plan to remedy past discrimination. The Supreme Court addressed the issue
of the least restrictive form of a remedy by distinguishing between layoffs of nonminority employees and future discriminatory hiring practices. Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 282-84, 294-95 (1986).
149. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2739 (1990).
150. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2756-59 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia stated:
The Court's opinion, of course, not only declines to confine Elrod and
Branti to dismissals in the narrow sense I have proposed ....

When the

courts are flooded with litigation under the most unmanageable of standards
(Brant) brought by that most persistent and tenacious of suitors (the
disappointed office-seeker) we may be moved to reconsider our intrusion
into this entire field.
Id. at 2758-59. Additionally, in his argument against the extension of Elrod and
Branti, Justice Scalia described the two cases as "wrong", "recent", "contradicted
by a long prior tradition", and "prove[n] unworkable in practice." Id. at 2756.
151. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,

-U.S.

__,

110 S. Ct. 2729,

2752 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the Rutan decision
implemented a constitutional civil-service system and that traditional patronage
employment practices should not be disturbed by the judiciary. Justice Scalia stated:
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Justice Scalia also argued that the restrictions placed upon the government's conduct and the constitutional standards used to evaluate
such conduct are different when the government acts as an employer

rather than as a lawmaker.' 52

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

In holding that the Elrod and Branti rationale extend to patronage
employment practices other than discharges, the Court determined
that an employee's first amendment rights were compromised by
patronage promotions, transfers, rehires, and hirings in the same way
that they were compromised by discharges.1 3 In each type of patron15 4
age practice, there is a pressure on an employee to change his belief.
The Court recognized that a "chilling" effect occurs when the government takes patronage employment actions which affect a public
employee's work.' 55 In order to be treated fairly and not to be
penalized, an employee will be pressured into changing his political
"The appropriate 'mix' of party-based employment is a political question if there
ever was one, and we should give it back to the voters of the various political units
to decide, through civil-service legislation crafted to suit the time and place, which
mix is best." Id. at 2758.
152. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,

-U.S.

__,

110 S. Ct. 2729,

2747-52 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relies on numerous prior decisions
of the Supreme Court to illustrate the different restrictions and constitutional
standards that are applied to the government in its capacity as an employer. See id.
-, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
153. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
2737 (1990). See Hoffinger, FirstAmendment Limitations on PatronageEmployment
Practices, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 200-202 (1982) (argues Branti applies to hiring);
Comment, Republican Need Only Apply: PatronageHiring and the FirstAmendment
in Avery v. Jennings, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1374, 1389 (1987) (content-neutral analysis

should be utilized); Note, Patronageand the FirstAmendment after Elrod v. Burns,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 468, 475-76 (1978) (argues Elrod should apply to hiring);
Comment, Political Patronage In Public Contracting, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 518 52728 n.58 (1984) (argues hiring should be treated similar to firing).
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners' argument: "Your Honor, that
is precisely the question that is before this Court, as to whether those factors that
were constitutionally impermissible in Branti and Elrod are constitutionally impermissible in the benefits of employment we are talking about here." Official Transcript
Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 7-8, Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (No. 88-1872 & 88-2074), reh'g
denied, 111 S.Ct. 13 (1990).
, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
154. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, __U.S.
2736 (1990).
155. Id.
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beliefs to correspond with the beliefs of his superiors.'5 6 This governmental pressure is the "coercion" that Elrod and Branti attempted to

curtail. 117

The Rutan majority concluded that by pressuring public employees to change their beliefs and associations, the government placed an
unconstitutional condition upon the receipt of public benefits.' 58 By
instituting adverse employment actions, the government was penalizing
employees who had failed to change their political beliefs.' 5 9 This
unconstitutional conditioning of governmental benefits was a violation
of the first amendment as recognized in Elrod and Branti.'6°
Once the Court recognized that non-discharge patronage practices
and patronage discharges both caused the same first amendment
infringements to arise, it applied the same constitutional scrutiny as
it had in Elrod and Branti. 6 This scrutiny requires the government

to narrowly tailor its patronage practices to further a vital government
interest.162 The majority agreed with Branti, that the only time the
government may use political affiliation as a factor in the employment
context is when the government can show that "party affiliation is
an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved." 163 If the government fails to demonstrate that "party
affiliation is appropriate," then the employment practices should be
found unconstitutional, as in Elrod and Branti. 164
156. Hoffinger, First Amendment Limitations on PatronageEmployment Practices, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 181, 195 (1982).
157. As argued by Mary Lee Leahy, counsel for the petitioners: "The conduct
in question in this case is the right not to affiliate or not to associate or not to
support particular political ideas. And that is protected by the first amendment. The
very coercion that this Court found existed in Elrod exists in this case." Official
Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the Unites States at 9, Rutan
v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
-, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (No. 88-1872
& 88-2074), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 13 (1990).
158. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2736 (1990).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2735.
161. Id. at 2736.
162. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2736 (1990).
163. Id. at 2735 n.5.
164. The Rutan Court, in extending Elrod and Branti, changed the burden on
the plaintiff to bring a patronage cause of action. In Elrod and Branti the plaintiff
had the burden of proving the employment decision was "based solely on political
affiliation or support." See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 508 (1976); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976). The Rutan Court only required the employment

RUTAN
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The Rutan majority failed to seize the opportunity to clarify the

ambiguity that exists in the Branti test. 165 Under the Branti test, a
public employee's position is not protected by the first amendment
when:
the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is
an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of
the public office involved. 166
The determinative inquiry of whether an employee is constitutionally
protected focuses on the subjective ability of the government employer
to prove that political affiliation is appropriate. As Justice Scalia

stated in his dissent, the meaning of this constitutional test is "anybody's guess."'

167

Because Rutan failed to clarify the scope of the

decision be "based on party affiliation or support." See Rutan v. Republican Party
of Illinois, .- __U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (1990). The Rutan Court does not
directly address the change from the stricter standard of "based solely on party
affiliation or support" to the standard "based on party affiliation or support."
Compare, Looney v. Flynn, No. 87-0764-5, Lexis screens 2-3 (D. Mass. Dec. 21,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (after Rutan, requiring "substantial factor"
or "motivating factor"), with Persico v. Villa, No. 89-CV-599, Lexis screen 1 (N.D.
N.Y. Jan. 14, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (after Rutan, requiring
"solely"). See, Comment, Republican Need Only Apply: PatronageHiring and the
First Amendment in Avery v. Jennings, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1374, 1379-86 (1987)
(discusses the difference between sole motive, mixed motive, and content-neutral).
165. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,

-U.S.

__,

110 S. Ct. 2729,

2735 n.5 (1990). The majority does not address the issue of the meaning of the
standard enunciated in Branti because the employees in the case conceded their claim
does not fall within the exception. However, Rutan, like Branti, has left government
officials "puzzled" with the Branti standard, because both decisions fail to provide
guidelines that clarify "how far down the bureaucratic job chain" the exception
extends. Siebert, PatronageRuling: Threat To PoliticalParties,Promise To Individual
Rights, ILL. IssuEs, Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 14-15.
166. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1976). Both the Elrod and Branti
Courts conceded the difficulty in trying to apply a standard that would distinguish
whether the position at issue should be determined on a patronage basis. Justice
Scalia in his dissent stated: "party membership is not a permissible factor in the
dispensation of government jobs, except those jobs for the performance of which
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement. It is hard to say precisely (or even
generally) what that exception means . . . ." Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
U.S.
.,110 S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

167. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, -U.S.
-, 110 S.Ct. 2729,
2756 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This ambiguity is illustrated by Justice Scalia in
his dissent by the following examples:
A city cannot fire a deputy sheriff because of political affiliation [Jones v.
Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329, 1338 (4th Cir. 1984)], but then again perhaps it
can [McBee v. Jim Hogg County, Texas, 730 F.2d 1009, 1014-1015 (4th
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Branti test, judges, attorneys, public employees, and employers will
continue to have difficulty determining whether a public employee
should receive first amendment protection from patronage practices.
The majority's failure to clarify the scope of the Branti test will make
the Rutan decision difficult to implement uniformly.
B.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

Political patronage case law has created vague and ambiguous
standards relating to the first amendment. 6 The Rutan Court had
Cir. 1984) (en banc)], especially if he is called the 'police captain' [Joyner
v. Lancaster, 553 F. Supp. 809, 818 (M.D. N.C. 1982), aff'd, 815 F.2d 20,
24 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987)]. A county cannot fire
on that basis its attorney for the department of social services [Layden v.
Costello, 517 F. Supp. 860, 862 (N.D. N.Y. 1981)], nor its assistant attorney
for family court [Tavano v. County of Niagara, New York, 621 F. Supp.
345, 349-350 (W.D. N.Y. 1985), aff'd mem., 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986)],
but a city can fire its solicitor and his assistants [Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d
517, 521-522 (3d Cir. 1981); Montaquila v. St. Cyr, 433 A.2d 206, 211 (R.I.
1981)], or its assistant city attorney [Finkelstein v. Barthelemy, 678 F. Supp
1255, 1265 (E.D. L.A. 1988)], or its assistant state's attorney [Livas v.
Petka, 711 F.2d 798, 800-801 (7th Cir. 1983)], or its corporation counsel
[Bavoso v. Harding, 507 F. Supp. 313, 316 (S.D. N.Y. 1980)]. A city cannot
discharge its deputy county clerk for his political affiliation [Barnes v.
Bosley, 745 F.2d 501, 508 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017
(1985)], but it can fire its legal assistant to the clerk on that basis [Bauer v.
Bosley, 802 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038
(1987)]. Firing a juvenile court bailiff seems impermissible [Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 351 (1976)], but it may be permissible if he is assigned
permanently to a single judge [Balogh v. Charron, 855 F.2d 356, 356-57
(6th Cir. 1988)]. A city cannot fire on partisan grounds its director of roads
[Abraham v. Pekarski, 537 F. Supp. 858, 865 (E.D. P.A. 1982), aff'd in
part and dismissed in part, 728 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1242 (1984)], but it can fire the second in command of the water department
[Tomczak v Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 643 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
946 (1985)]. A government cannot discharge for political reasons the senior
vice president of its development bank [De Choudens v. Government
Development Bank of Puerto Rico, 801 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987)], but it can discharge the regional director
of its rural housing administration [Rosario Nevarez v. Torres Gaztambide,
820 F.2d 525, 528-29 (1st Cir. 1987)]. The examples could be multiplied,
but this summary should make obvious that the 'tests' devised to implement
Branti have produced inconsistent and unpredictable results. The uncertainty
undermines the purpose of both the nonpatronage rule and the exception.
Id. at 2756-2757 (footnote numbers omitted).
168. Bhagwat, Patronageand the First Amendment: A Structural Approach, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1378 (1989).
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the opportunity to clarify two of these ambiguous standards in the

patronage employment area, but chose to address only one. In Rutan,

the Court has answered the difficult question of whether the Elrod
and Branti rationale should be extended to employment decisions
other than discharges in the affirmative. 169 In answering this question,
the Court has given uniform protection to non-policymaking public
employees' first amendment freedoms in the area of public employment law. 70 After the Rutan decision, the question is no longer
whether the employment practice is constitutional when instituted
it is whether the public emagainst a non-policymaking employee,
17
1
policymaker.
a
is
involved
ployee

Employees who are unsure if their position falls into the unprotected area of policymaking will not have uniform protection. 7 2 A
-, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
-U.S.
169. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
2739 (1990). See also Roque-Rodriguez v. Lema Moya, 926 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1991);
Lohorn v. Michal, 913 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990); Williams v. City of River Rouge,
909 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990); Zayas Rogriguez v. Hernandez, 748 F. Supp 47 (D.
Puerto Rico 1990); Farmer v. Mabus, No. J90-0206(B) (S.D. Miss. March 6, 1991)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Armington v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, No.
90-3698 (E.D. Penn. Jan. 24, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); La Marca v.
Eaton, No. 88-CV-3142 (E.D. N.Y. July 5, 1990) (Westlaw, Allfeds).
170. The Rutan decision may improve the administration of state government. Morale should improve among employees who have seen co-workers
promoted for political reasons. State government service may become more
attractive....
There still will be job patronage. Bureaucrats and government union
officials will continue to use their special knowledge of the personnel game
to help their friends secure jobs and promotions.
Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1990, § 1, at 19, col. 3.
171. The effect of the Rutan decision is debated by experts.
'This is a very easy decision to evade,' said Karen Burstein, a former head
of the state civil-service system. 'Within the arena of discretionary hiring
there is always going to be a fairly broad opportunity for decision-making,
and it will be very hard to be sure one has excluded partisan considerations.'
One national expert who analyzed the case, however, argued the ruling
would have a wide impact. 'This restores the original intent of the civil
service idea, basing hiring and promotion on merit rather than political
connection', said Frank Parker, director of the Voting Rights Project of the
Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
Newsday, Nassau and Suffolk Edition, June 22, 1990 at 3.
172. "There's a wide gray band of jobs that are debatable." United Press
International, July 19, 1990 (quoting William Ghesquiere, Governor Thompson's
legal counsel). "The Elrod and Branti tests set down extremely ambiguous guidelines
for the courts and attorneys to apply, and as such, courts continue to search for new
methods by which to determine which complaints state a legitimate cause of action."
Dugan, An Objective and Practical Test for Adjudicating Political Patronage Dismissals, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 277, 278 (1987).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. l I

lack of uniformity will result because the Rutan Court failed to clarify
the scope of the Branti test.' 73 This lack of clarification frustrates the
ultimate goals of Elrod, Branti and Rutan, which is to prevent

infringements of employees' first amendment rights while ensuring
the effective and efficient performance of the government. If an

employee is uncertain whether his position falls within the Branti
policymaker exception, he may be coerced into changing his political
beliefs rather than risk the chance of being penalized. If an employer
is uncertain whether her employee's position falls within the policy-

maker exception, she may take no action rather than expose herself
to the publicity of litigation. With the employee being coerced and
the government not acting to increase effectiveness and efficiency, the
goals of Elrod, Branti and Rutan cannot be successfully achieved.
The circuits' applications of the Branti test have been varied and
confused in determining who should be given protection. 7 4 This
confusion and variance will be multiplied as the Branti test is applied

to patronage practices other than discharges. Therefore, public employees across the country will remain uncertain of their protected
status unless they initiate costly litigation. 75 In addition, litigation

173. The Rutan decision reaffirmed "the Elrod exception and the refinements
to that exception as articulated in Branti," but failed to discuss the scope of this
exception. Lohorn v. Michal, 913 F.2d 327, 333 (7th Cir. 1990) (assistant chief of
police demoted to detective sergeant due to political affiliation). See Stott v. Haworth,
916 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 1990) (new governor took adverse employment actions
on a political patronage basis); Monks v. Inga, 923 F.2d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 1991)
(employees were discharged for union activity).
174. See supra note 167 and infra notes 175-191 and accompanying text for the
varying uses of the Branti test by the circuit courts.
175. Justice Scalia states in his dissent that: "These interpretations of Branti are
not only significantly at variance with each other; they are still so general that for
most positions it is impossible to know whether party affiliation is a permissible
requirement until a court renders its decision."
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, __U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2756
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The courts after Rutan are faced with the problem of determining who should
receive first amendment protection. See, Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, No.
90-3107 (6th Cir. March 13, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (Mayor's
Secretary); Soderstrum v. Town of Grand Isle, 925 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1991) (Police
Chief's Secretary); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1990) (class action);
Lohorn v. Michal, 913 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990) (Assistant Chief of Police); Tranello
v. Frey, No. 88-464L (W.D. N.Y. March 13, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts

file) (Deputy County Attorney); Walsh v. Ward, No. 90-3250 (C.D. Ill. March 1,
1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (Battalion Chief); Cavins v. Rice, No.
85C 10692 (E.D. I11.Jan. 23, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (Office of
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will increase because the Court has attracted attention to the issue of
patronage practices and has given public employees a new constitutional basis on which to bring a cause of action. 176 Finally, plaintiffs
may argue to extend the Elrod, Branti and Rutan decisions to include
77
other public non-employment patronage practices.
Professional Standards of the Chicago Police Department Coordinator of Opera-

tions); Thomas v. Carpenter, No. CV 88-1378 DWW (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1990)
(Westlaw, Ailfeds) (Lieutenant in Sheriff's Department). See also Auriemma v. Rice,
910 F.2d 1449 (7th Cir. 1990) (police officer).
176. "The high court's ruling will spur a substantial amount of litigation,
predicts Mr. [Frank R.] Parker [director of the Voting Rights Project of the Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law]. 'A lot of states may not have the systemic
screening process used by Illinois, but a number of states and local governments have
some kind of informal screening process."' Court Deals Blow to Patronage, Libel
Privilege, NAT'L L.J., July. 2, 1990, at 5, col. 3. Additionally, it has been said:
The Rutan decision poses more questions than it answers, and invites new
lawsuits. It does not appear to address, for example, the long-standing
practice of generating letters of recommendation from legislators, interest
groups and influential people other than party officials, to go into the job
aspirant's file in the governor's office.
Is it unconstitutional to award a job on the basis of letters of recommendation from non-party patrons? What jobs are exempt from the decision
because they are
policy-sensitive? Will businesses that have repeatedly been denied state
contracts for failure to make political contributions be emboldened to bring
suit, charging they are being denied 1st Amendment [sic] rights?
These questions suggest that future lawsuits will be aimed at all elements
of the patronage reward system. Those sued will likely include the interest
groups and contractors that benefit from the system.
Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1990 § 1, at 19, col. 3.
However, it has also been said that the Rutan decision will not cause a substantial
increase in the amount of litigation.
We have looked at the circuits, the Second, the Third, the Eleventh, and
the D.C. circuits that have adopted this kind of rule of law, and there has
not been that increase in litigation. We submit that the possibilities are far
more in the area of race or sex discrimination, and yet no one would suggest
to this Court, at least I hope not, that, if a person is denied a job because
of their sex or because of their race, that they have not stated a cause of
action. The possibility is far more in terms of litigation in those two areas
than it is in this area.
Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the Unites States at 41,
-, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (No.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, .U.S.
88-1872 & 88-2074), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 13 (1990).
177. The question of whether the Rutan decision will be applied to other public
employment practices besides discharges, hiring, rehiring, promotions, and transfers
is beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 176 for a discussion of the further
extension of Rutan. Compare, Lunblad v. Celeste, 924 F.2d 627, 628 (6th Cir. 1991)
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In extending a vague and inconsistently applied test, the Rutan
decision will cause confusion in the area of patronage employment
law, forcing the Supreme Court to address this issue again. The circuit
courts have already interpreted and applied the Branti test in significantly different ways.' These different applications will result in
employees receiving varying degrees of first amendment protection,
which will create the same type of problem that was resolved in Rutan.
A brief overview will illustrate that the Brantitest is applied differently
in the courts of appeals.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit formulated a two step
test to determine if an employee should receive first amendment
protection. 79 The first step is a threshold question that determines
whether the employee's position "involve[s] government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals
or their implementation."' 80 The second step focuses on the inherent
powers of the position and not on the functions of the employee who
fills the position.' This step is an inquiry that "examine[s] the
particular responsibilities of the position to determine whether it
resembles a policymaker, a privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function is such that
(Rutan does not extend to public contracts) with Kelly Kare v. O'Rourke, No. 90
CIV. 7418 (S.D. N.Y. Dec. 7, 1990) (Westlaw, Allfeds) (cannot discriminate against
contractors).

178. Id. See also, Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions:A Government Officials
Guide to PatronageDismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 11, 23-42 (1989) (illustrates each

circuit's different treatment of Branti). See supra note 167-177 and infra notes 179191 and accompanying text for the varying uses of the Branti test by the circuit
courts.
179. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986)
(en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, (1987). See Agosto-De-Feliciano v. AponteRoque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1213 (1st Cir. 1989) (Department of Education employees);
Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Lopez-Rivera, 878 F.2d 1478, 1480 (1st Cir. 1989) (Chief of
Fire Service, Director of the Board of Appeals of the Department of Social Services,
Assistant Chief of the Supply Division of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority);
McGurrin Ehrhard v. Connolly, 867 F.2d 92, 93 (1st Cir. 1989) (director of Secretary
of State's Western Massachusetts office was not protected); Cordero v. De JesusMendez, 867 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989) (municipal employees); Figueroa v. AponteRoque, 864 F.2d 947, 954 (1st Cir. 1989) (janitor for Department of Education was
protected); Rodriguez-Burgos v. Electric Energy Auth., 853 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir.
1988) (public utility official). For additional cases illustrating each circuit's different

treatment of the Branti test see, Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions:A Government

Officials Guide to PatronageDismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 23-42 (1989).
180. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-242 (1st Cir.
1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, (1987).
181. Id. at 242.
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party affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement.' '8 s2 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted a modified version
of the First Circuit's test by replacing the words "partisan" and

"political" with "policy."'' 8 3 This test strays from the reliance upon

political affiliation and tries to determine if the position is in a policy

area and whether the employee is a "policy level" employee.
Unlike the First and D.C. Circuits, the Second Circuit focuses
on one inquiry to determine if an employee is protected by the first
amendment.' The court went so far as to state that the Branti test
was unworkable dictum and then determined that political affiliation
is appropriate when "there is a rational connection between shared
ideology and job performance."'8

5

The Sixth Circuit focuses on "the

inherent duties of that position and the duties that the new holder of
that position will perform.' 8 6 The Seventh Circuit also focuses on
one inquiry which is whether the position "authorizes, either directly
or indirectly, meaningful input into the government decisionmaking

on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or
their implementation."' 87 The Third Circuit has adopted language
from the Seventh Circuit -and focuses on whether the employee has
"meaningful input into decision making concerning the nature and
scope of a major ... program."' 8 The Eight Circuit has also adopted

182. Id.
183. Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1988). (athletic director). The
D.C. Circuit asks first "whether the employee's position relates to an area as to
which there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation."
Id. at 264 (quoting Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982)). If the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative, then

the question is "whether the office gives the employee broad responsibilities with
respect to policy formulation, implementation, or enunciation." Id. at 264.
184. Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1988) (Confidential Secretary
to the Director of a corrections facility, Coordinator for Pre-Trial Release Services,
and First Deputy Service Officer for the County Veterans Service Officer).
185. Id. at 68.
186. Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, No. 90-3107 (6th Cir. March 13,
1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (relevant focus is not on the position as
performed). See, Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1991) (assistant prosecuting attorneys); Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990)
(City Attorney).
187. Lohorn v. Michal, 913 F.2d 327, 334 (7th Cir. 1990) (Director of Field
Operations) (quoting Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982)). See, Hudson v. Burke, 913 F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir.
1990) (City of Chicago Finance Committee members).
188. Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 169-70 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Nekolny v.
Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982)).
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language from the Seventh Circuit and states that the focus should
be on the "powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the
89
functions performed by a particular occupant of that office.'9
Finally, the Tenth Circuit focuses on "analyzing the nature of the
employee's duties and responsibilities."90
The different applications by the circuit courts illustrate the
increased uncertainty and inconsistency that will result in applying the
Branti test to more patronage practices.
When the Supreme Court addresses the issue of political patronage
again, it should adopt a clear test that will survive practical application. A clear objective test defining policymaking positions by the
actual duties of the position "rather than [by] the opinion of the
political party chiefs"' 91 will decrease litigation and uncertainty while
furthering the goals stated in Elrod, Branti and Rutan.' 92 Considering
that Rutan was decided by a 5-4 vote, it is likely that the Court would
opt for a new "brighter line" test rather than perpetuate Branti's
vague standard. 93 With a "brighter line" test, employees will know

189. Bauer v. Bosley, 802 F.2d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 1986) (staff legal assistant)

(quoting Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 946 (1985)).
190. Green v. Henley, 924 F.2d 185, 186 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Dickeson v.
Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1442 (10th Cir. 1988)). Dickeson recognized that some
circuits applied the duties of the position, while other applied the duties of the actual
employees. Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1988).
191. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (Does the government official
"believe that the official duties of various assistants ...

cannot be performed

effectively unless those persons share his political beliefs and party commitments?");
Dugan, An Objective and Practical Test For Adjudicating Political PatronageDismissals, 35 CLEV. ST. L.

REV.

277, 287 (1987).

192. Bhagwat, Patronageand the First Amendment: A StructuralApproach, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1378 (1989). Rutan itself illustrated the need to prevent
increases in litigation in order to prevent the reduction of governmental efficiency.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 868 F.2d 943, 954 (7th Cir. 1989).
193. "Rutan is the Supreme Court's latest statement on patronage but may not
be the last. Four of the eight justices now sitting on the Supreme Court conclude
that Elrod and Branti should be overruled rather than extended." Hudson v. Burke,
913 F.2d 427, 428 n.l (7th Cir. 1990) (city employee brought suit for wrongful
discharge). The debate of whether other employment practices have the same coercive
effect on an employee's first amendment rights is closely divided. Greenberg v.
Kmetko, 922 F.2d 382, 383 (7th Cir. 1991). Jesse Choper, the Dean and a Professor
of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, thinks the Rutan decision is "a
strong candidate for overruling." ConstitutionalLaw Conference, 59 U.S.L.W. 2272,
2273 (November 6, 1990). Laurence Tribe, a Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law
at Harvard University, also believes Rutan is "ripe for overruling." Id. at 2281.
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when their rights have been infringed upon and government employers
will know when their actions are unconstitutional.' 9
This author suggests that one preferable alternative to the Branti
test would be to adopt a test focusing on the inherent duties of the
position at issue. 195 This test would apply objective standards, instead

of subjective ones. If an employer and employee are aware of the
objective criteria applied, they are better able to determine whether a
given public position is a policymaking one. This approach would
further the ultimate goals of Elrod, Branti, and Rutan.
Before looking to the proposed test, the definition of policymaking must be examined as it applies in the patronage context. The term
"policymaker" may be subject to three types of interpretation:196 (1)
that every employees' position involves policymaking, even though it
may affect only the employee herself and not others; 97 (2) that some
employees' positions involve daily administration of the government,

but do not affect the social, economic, or political programs of the
governing party; 98 and (3) that some employees determine which
policies are promoted and executed in accord with the ideologies of
specific political parties.' 99 It is the last definition of policymaker that

should effect whether an employee receives first amendment protection.

The test to determine who is a policymaker should examine the
"powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the function

performed by a particular occupant of the office."

2°°

Some of the

194. Id.

195. See, supra notes 181, 186, 189, 190 and accompanying text for circuits that
are in agreement.
196. Note, An Objective and PracticalTest ForAdjudicatingPoliticalPatronage
Dismissals, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 277, 285 (1987).
197. Note, ConstitutionalLaw-First Amendment-PatronageDismissals Not Permitted Unless Party Affiliation Relevant to Job Performance, 29 KAN. L. REv. 286,
288 (1981).
198. Note, An Objective and PracticalTest ForAdjudicating PoliticalPatronage
Dismissals, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 277, 285 (1987).
199. Id.
200. Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1990)

(power inherent in the office); Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 1986)
("function of the public office in question and not the actual past duties of the

particular employee involved"); Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d
236, 242 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987) ("function of the public
office in question and not the actual duties of the particular employee involved");
Bauer v. Bosley, 802 F.2d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038
(1987) ("powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the functions performed
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objective criteria used to place the employment position appropriately
on the spectrum between the extremes of policymaker and clerk are
"[the] relative pay, technical competence, power to control others,
authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public perception,
influences on programs, contact with elected officials and responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders." ' 20 ' Other criteria include
the job description and applicable civil service statutes. 20 2 A test that
focuses on the duties performed in a public position provides specific
criteria that allows for a more workable test to determine who is to
receive first amendment protection.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Rutan, the United States Supreme Court decided to extend
the Elrod and Branti rationale to patronage practices beyond discharges. This decision appears to give public employees uniform first
amendment protection and adds to employment stability within the
government. However, the Supreme Court's failure to clarify who is
to receive first amendment protection will increase rather than decrease
confusion in the area of patronage employment law. By simply
addressing half the issue, the Supreme Court will create even more
confusion in the lower courts. While the partial clarification in the
Rutan decision should not be overlooked, its overall effect will
nevertheless be to promote further confusion and litigation.
David Herman

by a particular occupant of that office"); Tranello v. Frey, No. 88-464L (W.D. N.Y.
March 13, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
201. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 242 (1st Cir. 1986)
(en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987).
202. Id. at 243-47.

